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Start-Up Subsidies for the Unemployed: 
Long-Term Evidence and Effect Heterogeneity
* 
 
Turning unemployment into self-employment has become an increasingly important part of 
active labor market policies (ALMP) in many OECD countries. Germany is a good example 
where the spending on start-up subsidies for the unemployed accounted for nearly 17% of 
the total spending on ALMP in 2004. In contrast to other programs – like vocational training, 
job creation schemes, or wage subsidies – the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of 
such schemes is still scarce; especially regarding long-term effects and effect heterogeneity. 
This paper aims to close this gap. We use administrative and survey data from a large 
sample of participants in two distinct start-up programs and a control group of unemployed 
individuals. We find that over 80% of participants are integrated in the labor market and have 
relatively high labor income five years after start-up. Additionally, participants are much more 
satisfied with their current occupational situation compared to previous jobs. Based on 
conditional propensity score matching methods we estimate the long-term effects of the 
programs against non-participation. Our results show that both programs are effective with 
respect to income and employment outcomes in the long-run. Moreover, we consider effect 
heterogeneity with respect to several dimensions and show that start-up subsidies for the 
unemployed tend to be most effective for disadvantaged groups in the labor market. 
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The recent OECD report on income and poverty (OECD, 2008) illustrates an increase
in poverty rates over the past decade, where the risk of becoming poor shifted from the
elderly in particular towards children and people of working age. The importance of em-
ployment in this context is straightforward as poverty among non-working households
increased sharply during the last decade. The poverty rate1 for households where the head
is of working age but no household member actually works amounted to 36% and was three
(twelve) times higher than for households with one (two or more) worker in the mid-2000s.
Despite cross-country variation in terms of the scope of poverty, the negative correlation
between employment rates and poverty is throughout valid. In an earlier study, Sen (1997)
presents diﬀerent concepts on how unemployment may cause poverty and inequality due to
social exclusion. The main idea is that speciﬁc groups of individuals are generally excluded
from the labor market, for example low skilled or youth. In addition, economic conditions
may also foster social exclusion. He argues that along with the abolishment of social exclu-
sion, unemployment and therefore poverty will be reduced. Governments are fully aware of
this concept and therefore spend signiﬁcant amounts of their budget on active labor market
policies (ALMP) to equalize labor market conditions of unemployed individuals, in which
a special focus is usually put on disadvantaged groups. By removing severe diﬀerences in
terms of education, work experience or productivity, existing labor market barriers are to
be overcome, consequently reducing unemployment. Several labor market programs have
been introduced in which the most popular programs are traditionally training measures
such as retraining, classroom training or on-the-job training. Furthermore, employment
subsidies, job creation schemes and job-search assistance have also been adapted by almost
all OECD countries. These programs are supposed to integrate unemployed individuals in
the labor market and are associated with an upward shift in income level to secure one’s
livelihood and an increase in life and job satisfaction. Much research has been dedicated to
investigating the eﬀectiveness of ALMP programs. Although positive results with respect
to income and employment prospects were found occasionally, the overall evidence indi-
cates that the eﬀects of those traditional measures are rather disappointing (see Martin
and Grubb, 2001; Dar and Gill, 1998; Dar and Tzannatos, 1999; or Fay, 1996 for evidence
on OECD countries and Kluve and Schmidt, 2002 for the European experience). In par-
ticular, job creation schemes turn out to be not appropriate for improving participants’
employment perspectives.
On the other hand, it is found that the promotion of self-employment among unem-
ployed individuals is a promising tool. Public authorities usually tie start-up subsidies
with the hope for a “double dividend”. Besides creating a job for the self-employed them-
selves, the newly founded businesses may potentially create further jobs and thus reduce
unemployment rates even further. Moreover, individuals who receive support also increase
their employability, human capital and labor market networks during the period of self-
employment, which, in the case of failure, makes them more able to ﬁnd regular employ-
1The poverty rate is deﬁned as the share of people with an equivalised disposable income below 50% of
the median of the entire population.
1ment. Start-up subsidies may also be promising from a macroeconomic perspective, since
the entry of new ﬁrms generally increases competition and consequently productivity of
ﬁrms. This potentially can promote eﬃcient markets and technology diﬀusion and might
ﬁnally lead to economic stability and economic growth, i.e., an increase in wealth (see
Storey, 1994; Fritsch, 2008). However, there are also some concerns related to ﬁnancial
promotion of start-ups by the unemployed. First of all, supported individuals may have
become self-employed even without ﬁnancial support. This is referred to as deadweight
loss and is usually hard to determine.2 Another concern addresses crowding out eﬀects,
whereby incumbent or non-subsidized ﬁrms may be displaced by supported start-ups. Fi-
nally, ﬁrms may also substitute employees with subsidized self-employed workers. Due to
a highly regulated labor market in Germany, however, such substitution eﬀects are likely
to play only a minor role in practice.
We focus in our analysis on the eﬀects of start-up subsidies on the participating indi-
viduals only, that is we do not address any macroeconomic or general-equilibrium eﬀects.
Most of the existing evaluation studies on start-up schemes report positive eﬀects with
respect to diﬀerent labor market outcomes. The evidence varies with respect to countries
and institutional design of support. A main shortcoming of previous studies is that they
provide short to medium-run evidence only and—especially in the case of industrialized
countries—do not consider eﬀect heterogeneity. If the analysis is conducted at a point
at which individuals still receive the support, the results are likely to be upward biased
due to locking-in eﬀects. To properly judge the eﬀects of the programs, the observation
window needs to be (substantially) longer than the period of support. Furthermore, it
can be assumed that there will be heterogeneity in the eﬀects of these programs, which
implies that some groups might beneﬁt more and others less from participation. This is of
special interest for particular disadvantaged groups, for example low educated or young
individuals who are over-represented among the long-term unemployed and socially ex-
cluded. Knowing how start-up schemes work for these groups will help to design programs
more appropriate and thereby tackle long-term unemployment, social exclusion, and the
associated risk of poverty.
The aim of this paper is to close the existing research gap by providing long-term
evidence and an extensive analysis with respect to eﬀect heterogeneity for two distinct
start-up subsidies for unemployed individuals in Germany. The ﬁrst program—bridging
allowance (BA, “¨ Uberbr¨ uckungsgeld”)—provided relatively high ﬁnancial support (de-
pending on individuals’ previous earnings) to unemployed workers for six months; whereas
the second program—start-up subsidy (SUS, “Existenzgr¨ undungszuschuss”)—consisted of
(lower) monthly lump-sum payments for up to three years.3 Since both schemes diﬀer
sharply in terms of ﬁnancial support and duration, they also attracted diﬀerent types
of individuals. Using a combination of administrative and survey data, we are able to
follow individuals for nearly ﬁve years after entering the programs. In addition, we also
have access to a suitable control group of other unemployed individuals allowing us to use
2Meager (1993) provides an estimate of the deadweight eﬀect related to the bridging allowance in
Germany and concludes that the eﬀect is rather small (about 10%).
3Both programs were replaced in August 2006 by a single new program—the new start-up subsidy
program (Gr¨ undungszuschuss)—which will not be analyzed here.
2conditional propensity score matching methods for the impact analysis. We ﬁnd strong
positive long-run eﬀects for both programs with respect to several labor market outcomes.
In addition, we show that they are most eﬀective for individuals at high risk of being
excluded from the labor market, i.e., low educated and low qualiﬁed individuals.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review on ALMP
in OECD countries, institutional details on start-up programs for the unemployed in Ger-
many and a discussion of previous results on such measures. Afterwards we describe the
data, discuss descriptive results and illustrate the identiﬁcation and estimation strategy
in Section 3. The main results are discussed in Section 4, which also contains an extensive
analysis of eﬀect heterogeneity. Finally, we test our results with respect to unobserved
heterogeneity before we conclude in Section 5.
2 ALMP to Reintegrate Unemployed Individuals
2.1 Previous Literature
The OECD reports an average spending of 0.6% of a country’s GDP on ALMP among all
OECD member states in 2007, and therefore, much research has been conducted investigat-
ing the eﬀectiveness of such measures (see OECD, 2009). The main question is whether
ALMP programs are appropriate for improving participants’ labor market perspectives
and in addition whether they also generate income gains for participants. For instance,
Martin and Grubb (2001), Dar and Tzannatos (1999) and Fay (1996) review evaluation
studies on ALMP across OECD countries and present mixed results for several programs.
In fact, they do ﬁnd some positive results for certain subgroups, for example training for
the long-term unemployed, or women. Dar and Gill (1998) consider retraining programs
in OECD countries and are not able to identify signiﬁcant eﬀects. Focusing on Europe,
Kluve and Schmidt (2002) ﬁnd strong heterogenous eﬀects for diﬀerent programs and sub-
groups and argue that job search assistance and training might be eﬀective. Card, Kluve,
and Weber (2009) provide an international meta-analysis of recent evaluation studies on
the eﬀectiveness of ALMP programs and conﬁrm the overall ineﬀectiveness of job creation
schemes. Moreover, they ﬁnd promising eﬀects for classroom or on-the-job training in the
medium-run. In an earlier review on the US and European experience, Heckman, LaLonde,
and Smith (1999) point out that beneﬁts from ALMP programs do not signiﬁcantly re-
duce poverty or unemployment, however, employment gains are more likely to occur as
an increase in income levels. Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar (2004) provide an overview on
the eﬀectiveness of ALMP in developing and transition countries and ﬁnd some positive
results for employment services while training measures, public works and wage subsi-
dies are rather unsuccessful. For Germany, Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and V¨ olter (2008)
and Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004) ﬁnd positive eﬀects for training measures in
the long-run. Moreover, Stephan (2008) and Stephan and Pahnke (2008) provide evidence
for vocational training, short-term training, wage subsidies and job creation schemes and
show consistently negative eﬀects for job creation schemes (in line with Caliendo, Hujer,
and Thomsen, 2008) and mostly positive but not always signiﬁcant eﬀects for the other
3programs under consideration. Lechner and Wunsch (2008) conclude that programs such
as vocational training, wage subsidies, short-term training and assessment schemes are
overall ineﬀective for the West German labor market. To sum up, despite occasionally
positive results, the overall evidence indicates that traditional measures are rather disap-
pointing. In particular job creation schemes turned out to be not appropriate for improving
participants’ employment prospects, and training programs bring modest eﬀects only in
the (very) long-run.
In light of these ﬁndings, supporting unemployed individuals in becoming self-employed
might be promising tool among active labor market policies. The international evidence is
still relatively scarce on such measures but predominantly indicates positive results. For
developing countries, for instance, Almeida and Galasso (2007) investigate the impact of
ﬁnancial and technical assistance for welfare beneﬁciaries on their way to self-employment
in Argentina. They observe a period of 12 months in 2004/2005 and ﬁnd an increase in
total working hours but no signiﬁcant income eﬀects due to the program. However, for
young and highly educated individuals they are able to identify positive income eﬀects.
Rodriguez-Planas (2008) investigates a start-up program for Romania in which the partic-
ipants obtained professional assistance through counseling or short-term entrepreneurial
training. In addition, working capital loans were oﬀered. She identiﬁes positive employ-
ment eﬀects but no income gains for participants compared to non-participants and reveals
strong positive employment eﬀects for a subgroup of low educated individuals. O’Leary
(1999) considers self-employment schemes for Poland and Hungary. The scheme in Poland
provides loans at market interest rates to the unemployed combined with the attractive
option that 50% of repayments will be waived if ﬁrms survive at least two years. In con-
trast, the Hungarian program consists of unemployment beneﬁts paid up to 18 months.
In addition, it also incurs half of the costs for training and counseling. O’Leary (1999)
ﬁnds large and positive employment eﬀects for both countries. Whilst he is also able to
identify strong positive earning eﬀects for Hungary, the income eﬀect in Poland is neg-
ative.4 Among participants, O’Leary (1999) ﬁnds high survival rates in self-employment
and additional employment eﬀects in both countries. The ﬁndings are similarly positive for
developed countries. Carling and Gustafson (1999) provide a comparative study between
employment subsidies and self-employment grants for the unemployed in Sweden. They
ﬁnd that individuals in subsidized employment have a higher probability of re-entering
unemployment than recipients of self-employment grants. Therefore, they conclude that
self-employment grants are more eﬀective in avoiding unemployment. Cueto and Mato
(2006) analyze the success of self-employment subsidies for particular districts in Spain.
They ﬁnd survival rates of approximately 93% after two years and 76% after ﬁve. For New
Zealand, Perry (2006) evaluates enterprise allowance grants, an integrated program that
provides business skills training as well as ﬁnancial aid. The author’s results indicate a
decrease in time registered as unemployed for participants. Meager, Bates, and Cowling
(2003) evaluate business start-up subsidies by the Prince Trust to young people in the UK.
The authors conclude that participating in the programme does not have any signiﬁcant
4O’Leary (1999) primarily attributes the negative earning eﬀect in the case of Poland to ﬁrms’ reluctance
in full disclosure to the tax authorities.
4impact on subsequent employment or earning chances. Nonetheless, descriptively they ﬁnd
a fraction of 69.1% in self-employment among participants after 18 months. Kelly, Lewis,
Mulvey, and Dalzell (2002) consider an allowance paid up to 52 weeks as well as training
and counseling in Australia. The authors ﬁnd a survival rate of 56.2% in self-employment
after three years following start-up.
In a study for Germany which is very closely related to ours, Baumgartner and Caliendo
(2008) provide an evaluation of BA and SUS programs for the short and medium-run. They
ﬁnd strong positive employment and income eﬀects for participants compared to a group
of non-participants. However, the authors underscore the preliminary character of their
results, as the majority of start-up subsidy participants still received ﬁnancial support
during the observation period. Therefore, the survival rate is likely to further decrease
after ﬁnancial support completely expires. In an earlier study, Pfeiﬀer and Reize (2000)
analyze the eﬀect of BA on survival rates in self-employment during the ﬁrst year after
entry. They ﬁnd neither diﬀerences in survival probability nor in employment growth
between supported and non-subsidized ﬁrms in West Germany.
To summarize, the existing literature on start-up schemes for the unemployed mainly
reports either positive or insigniﬁcant eﬀects with respect to diﬀerent labor market out-
comes; whilst negative impacts are scarce. Eﬀect heterogeneity is considered only by studies
on developing countries. The evidence varies with respect to countries, institutional design
of the support and entrance conditions. However, the main shortcoming is that existing
studies provide evidence for the short to medium-run only. Long-term evidence is indeed
highly demanded by the literature but—due to data limitations—still missing. We are
now able to observe supported ﬁrms up to ﬁve years since start-up and hence contribute
long-term evidence to the literature. Moreover, we show in an extensive analysis with re-
spect to eﬀect heterogeneity for which subgroups of individuals such programs are most
eﬀective.
2.2 Institutional Settings in Germany
Before heading to the empirical section, we discuss the institutional settings of start-up
programs for the unemployed in Germany. The bridging allowance, introduced in 1986,
remained the only program providing support to unemployed individuals who wanted to
start their own business until 2003. Its main goal was to cover basic costs of living and
social security contributions during the initial stages of self-employment. The recipient of
BA received the same amount during the ﬁrst six months he or she would have received
if unemployed. Since the unemployment scheme also covers social security contributions
(including health insurance, retirement insurance, etc.) a lump sum for social security
is granted equal to 68.5% of the unemployment support that would have been received.
Unemployed individuals were entitled to BA on condition of their business plan being
externally approved, usually by the regional chamber of commerce. Thus, approval of an
individual’s application did not depend on the case manager at the local labor oﬃce.
In January 2003, an additional program was initiated to support unemployed people in
starting a new business. This start-up subsidy was introduced as part of a large package
5of ALMP programs introduced through the “Hartz reforms”5. As was the case with BA,
the main goal of SUS is to secure the initial phase of self-employment. It focuses on the
provision of social security to the newly self-employed person. The support comprises of a
lump sum payment of e600 per month in the ﬁrst year. A growth barrier is implemented in
SUS such that the support is only granted if income does not exceed e25,000 per year. The
support shrinks to e360 per month in the second year and to e240 per month in the third.
In contrast to the BA, SUS recipients have to pay into the statutory pension fund and
may claim a reduced rate for statutory health insurance. When the SUS was introduced in
2003, applicants did not have to submit business plans for prior approval, but they have
been required to do so since November 2004. Moreover, parallel receipt of BA and SUS is
excluded. The important features of both programs are summarized in Table 1. Moreover,
it should be mentioned that other institutions such as federal state governments or the
chamber of commerce oﬀer general programs to encourage self-employment, for example,
counseling, preparatory courses or even capital loans. Additionally, in some professions
self-employment is highly restrictive in Germany when compared to other countries. For
some “typical” self-employed occupations (physicians, lawyers, etc.) and several handcraft
occupations it is required to occupy an advanced certiﬁcate in order to be allowed to
become self-employed. However, Cressy (1996) argues that such preconditions for entry
into self-employment tend to signiﬁcantly enhance survival of businesses. In addition to
entry restrictions, the German system prevents entrepreneurs from founding a company
again if their business went bankrupt once.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
Due to the institutional framework, it was rather rational to choose BA if unemploy-
ment beneﬁts were fairly high or if the income generated through the start-up ﬁrm was
expected to exceed e25,000 per year. Both programs were replaced in August 2006 by a
single new program—the new start-up subsidy program (Gr¨ undungszuschuss)—which will
not be analyzed here.6 Table 2 contains number of entries into start-up programs as well
as other programs of ALMP in West Germany. It is noticeable that start-up programs
are comparable in terms of number of entries to other programs of ALMP, such as wage
subsidies (WS) or vocational training (VT). On the other hand, entries into training mea-
sures (TM) are more than three times as much; but, of course, one has to keep in mind
that TM are rather short-term, i.e., with a maximum duration of three months and an
average duration of two weeks. Accordingly, entrance requirements are much lower. As we
can see, the scope of the new start-up subsidy (New SUS) is below the cumulated number
of entries in BA and SUS.
5See Caliendo (2009) for an overview of the most relevant elements of the “Hartz reforms”.
6The new start-up subsidy consists of unemployment beneﬁts and a lump-sum payment of e300 per
month for social coverage paid for nine months. Afterwards the lump-sum payment of e300 might be
extended for further six months if the business is the full-time activity of the applicant. See Caliendo and
Kritikos (2009) for information and a critical discussion of the features of the new program.
63 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
In our analysis we focus on entries into SUS and BA in the third quarter of 2003 and
combine administrative data from the “Federal Employment Agency” (FEA) with a survey
such that longitudinal as well as cross-section data are available. We draw on data used by
Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008) and extend it with an additional interview wave.7 The
administrative part consists of data based on the “Integrated Labour Market Biographies”
(ILMB) of the FEA, containing relevant register data from four sources: employment
history, unemployment support recipience, participation in active labor market measures,
and job seeker history. Since the administrative data do not provide any information
on self-employed individuals, the ILMB data are complemented by information from a
computer-assisted telephone interview. For this, participants for each program who became
self-employed in the third quarter of 2003 are randomly drawn. The comparison group is
restricted to those who were unemployed in the third quarter of 2003, eligible to participate
in either of the two programs, but did not join a program in this quarter. However, controls
are allowed to participate in ALMP programs afterwards.8 The ﬁrst two interviews took
place in January/February of 2005 and 2006; the ﬁnal one was conducted in May/June of
2008. This enables us to follow individuals up to ﬁve years after start-up.
Insert Table 3 about here
We restrict our sample to men in West Germany for two reasons. Men are more likely to
become full-time self-employed than women; and West Germany is characterized by better
labor market conditions compared to East Germany. We are interested in the eﬀectiveness
of start-up schemes to integrate former unemployed individuals in the labor market and
we avoid several side-eﬀects, such as labor supply decisions, macroeconomic constraints
and so on, by excluding women and the East German labor market. Table 3 provides the
number of realized interviews in the respective waves. In the case of SUS, for instance,
we initially started with 1,116 individuals who became self-employed in the third quarter
of 2003; 811 responded to the second interview and ﬁnally we end up with 486 after the
last interview in 2008. Hence, our ﬁnal sample consists of 486 participants in SUS, 780
recipients of BA and 929 non-participants.
3.2 Descriptive Evidence
Table A.1 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics measured at entry into program in
the third quarter of 2003 separately for participants (SUS and BA) and non-participants.
Participants in SUS are on average younger and lower educated individuals with less
7Therefore, we only brieﬂy discuss the basic data construction and refer to Baumgartner and Caliendo
(2008) for a more extensive discussion of the data issues.
8The actual number of non-participants who participated in ALMP programs after the third quarter
2003 is rather low. Approximately 15% of all non-participants were assigned to programs of ALMP and
only 2% participated in SUS or BA within our observation period.
7employment duration and lower earnings in the past. This is in line with our expectations,
as the ﬁnancial support in case of BA depends on previous earnings and is only paid for
a short period of six months. Hence, individuals with low earnings in the past are only
eligible to minor support if they choose BA. It is therefore rational for those individuals to
choose SUS because the subsidy is small but it might be extended up to three years. On
the other hand, individuals with higher earnings want to secure their high entitlement and,
consequently, choose BA. Moreover, in terms of location participants seem to be equally
distributed throughout West Germany. As pointed out in previous research (e.g. Dunn
and Holtz-Eakin, 2000), we ﬁnd that self-employment is inﬂuenced by intergenerational
transmission, i.e., the fraction with parental self-employment among participants is higher
than among non-participants.
Insert Table 4 about here
In Table 4 we provide the labor market status of participants and non-participants
after 28 and 56 months following start-up and the monthly income after 56 months. All
descriptive results are weighted using sequential inverse probability weighting to adjust for
the selection process due to panel attrition (see Wooldridge, 2002).9 First of all, a closer
look at the labor market developments of participants reveals that the fraction of self-
employed individuals decreases from 71.5% to 67.9% for former BA recipients and from
67.6% to 59.7% for ﬁrms initially supported by SUS. Hence, the decline in self-employment
is more than twice as high for SUS (-7.9 percentage points) than for BA (-3.6 percentage
points) in the given period. This is mainly due to the fact that SUS expired between the
second and third interview; whereas BA support had already stopped after six months,
that was before the ﬁrst interview took place. The sharp drop in self-employment rates
after the end of the subsidy period may be seen as indication that some businesses were
only able to survive with the help of the subsidy.
However, the main objective of ALMP is not primarily to create self-employment but
to integrate unemployed individuals into the labor market. Hence, we now consider the
share of individuals either in self-employment or regular employment. After 56 months
since start-up, we ﬁnd about 81% of SUS and 89% of former BA participants well inte-
grated in the labor market. For non-participants, only 63% are either self-employed or
regularly employed. Hence, we observe a raw diﬀerence of employment rates of about 20%
between participants and non-participants. These are descriptives only and the gap is po-
tentially caused by diﬀerences in key variables. We return to this point in Section 3.3 when
discussing the identiﬁcation strategy and ﬁnally present causal eﬀects of the programs in
Section 4.1.
9As we can see in Table 3 the number of realized interviews decreased partly dramatically. On average,
we are only able to observe 45% of all participants and 37% of non-participants for the entire period of
56 months. We checked our results with respect to potential selection process due to panel attrition and
ﬁnd positive selection, i.e., individuals who perform relatively well in terms of labor market outcomes are
more likely to respond. Therefore, we use sequential inverse probability weighting to adjust for this selective
attrition. Our matching results later on rely on unweighted outcome variables because participants and
non-participants are similarly aﬀected by selection due to panel attrition.
8With respect to another objective of ALMP, the achievement of certain income levels
for participants, we also provide in Table 4 net income measures. Here, the income is mea-
sured 56 months after start-up. Next to working income, the total income captures transfer
payments such as unemployment beneﬁt, pension, or child beneﬁt. We can see that former
BA recipients have higher income in terms of both working and total income compared to
SUS participants. This is not surprising because of the aforementioned selection into BA
of highly educated individuals with high earnings in the past. It is also noticeable that
non-participants earn on average less than participants; however considering the median
of the income distribution, the diﬀerence to SUS participants almost vanishes.
Insert Table 5 about here
Finally, to answer the question whether participants are more satisﬁed with their em-
ployment status compared to previous dependent employment, Table 5 provides some
evidence on job satisfaction among participants who are self-employed at the third inter-
view. The respondents were asked to compare their self-employment with the previous
employment spell with respect to diﬀerent aspects. Thereby, positive values indicate an
overall improvement while negative values depict a decline. For participants in both pro-
grams, the situation improved in terms of type of activity, income and promotion prospects
but declined for measures such as workload, working time and social security. However,
the improvement among the ﬁrst three measures is obviously more valued by individuals
than the decrease in the latter because of higher absolute values.
3.3 Identiﬁcation of Causal Eﬀects
In order to estimate causal eﬀects, we base our analysis on the potential outcome frame-
work, also known as the Roy (1951) - Rubin (1974) model. The two potential outcomes
are Y 1 (individual receives treatment, D = 1) and Y 0 (individual does not receive treat-
ment, D = 0). The observed outcome for any individual i can be written as: Yi =
Y 1
i · Di + (1 − Di) · Y 0
i . The treatment eﬀect for each individual i is then deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between her potential outcomes: τi = Y 1
i − Y 0
i . Since we can never observe
both potential outcomes for the same individual at the same time, the fundamental eval-
uation problem arises. We will focus on the most prominent evaluation parameter, which
is the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT), and is given by:
τATT = E(Y 1 | D = 1) − E(Y 0 | D = 1). (1)
The last term on the right hand side of equation (1) describes the hypothetical out-
come without treatment for those individuals who received treatment. Since the condition
E(Y 0 | D = 1) = E(Y 0 | D = 0) is usually not satisﬁed with non-experimental data,
estimating ATT by the diﬀerence in sub-population means of participants E(Y 1 | D = 1)
and non-participants E(Y 0 | D = 0) will lead to a selection bias. This bias arises because
participants and non-participants are selected groups that would have diﬀerent outcomes,
9even in the absence of the program due to observable or unobservable factors.10 We ap-
ply propensity score matching and thus rely on the conditional independence assumption
(CIA), which states that conditional on observable characteristics (W) the counterfac-
tual outcome is independent of treatment: Y 0 q D|W, where q denotes independence.
In addition to the CIA, we also assume overlap: Pr(D = 1 | W) < 1, for all W. This
implies that there is a positive probability for all W of not participating, i.e., that there
are no perfect predictors which determine participation. These assumptions are suﬃcient
for identiﬁcation of the ATT, which can then be written as:
τMAT
ATT = E(Y 1|W,D = 1) − EW[E(Y 0|W,D = 0)|D = 1], (2)
where the ﬁrst term can be estimated from the treatment group and the second term from
the mean outcomes of the matched comparison group. The outer expectation is taken over
the distribution of W in the treatment group.
As direct matching on W can become hazardous when W is of high dimension (“curse
of dimensionality”), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest using balancing scores b(W).
These are functions of the relevant observed covariates W such that the conditional
distribution of W given b(W) is independent of the assignment to treatment, that is,
W q D|b(W). The propensity score P(W), i.e., the probability of participating in a pro-
gram, is one possible balancing score. For participants and non-participants with the same
balancing score, the distributions of the covariates W are the same, i.e., they are balanced
across the groups. Hence, the identifying assumption can be re-written as Y 0 q D|P(W)
and the new overlap condition is given by Pr(D = 1 | P(W)) < 1.
The CIA is clearly a very strong assumption and the applicability of the matching es-
timator depends crucially on its plausibility. Blundell, Dearden, and Sianesi (2005) argue
that the plausibility of such an assumption should always be discussed on a case-by-case
basis. Only variables which simultaneously inﬂuence the participation decision and the
outcome variable should be included in the matching procedure. Hence, economic theory,
a sound knowledge of previous research, and information about the institutional setting
should guide the researcher in specifying the model (see, e.g., Smith and Todd, 2005 or
Sianesi, 2004). We use both administrative and survey data, which enables us to control for
numerous individual information and labor market conditions. Based on this exhaustive
data, we argue that the CIA holds in our application. However, we test the sensitivity of
the results with respect to time-invariant unobserved diﬀerences between participants and
non-participants by implementing conditional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID). This allows
for unobservable but temporally invariant diﬀerences in outcomes between participants
and non-participants, which obviously relaxes the CIA. Conditional DID was initially
suggested by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998). It extends the conventional
DID estimator by deﬁning outcomes conditional on the propensity score and using semi-
parametric methods to construct the diﬀerences. If the parameter of interest is ATT, the
10See, for example Caliendo and Hujer (2006) for further discussion.
10conditional DID estimator is based on the following identifying assumption:
E[Y 0
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 1] = E[Y 0
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 0], (3)
where (t) is the post-treatment and (t0) the pre-treatment period. It also requires the
common support condition to hold and can be written as:
τCDID
ATT = E(Y 1
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 1) − E(Y 0
t − Y 0
t0|P(W),D = 0). (4)
For identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects, any general equilibrium eﬀects need to be excluded,
that is treatment participation of one individual can not have an impact on outcomes of
other individuals. This assumption is referred to as stable-unit-treatment-value-assumption
(SUTVA). Imbens and Wooldridge (2008) argue that the validity of such an assumption
depends on the scope of the program as well as on resulting eﬀects. They infer that for
the majority of labor market programs, the SUTVA is potentially fulﬁlled because such
programs are usually of small scope with rather limited eﬀects on the individual level. We
follow their argumentation and refer to Table 2, where we see that entries into SUS and
BA are approximately of the same scope as other ALMP programs and in relation to the
total number of entries into unemployment of 5.5 million in 2004 quite small.
3.4 Estimation Procedure
After having discussed identiﬁcation issues, we proceed with the estimation of causal ef-
fects. We apply propensity score matching and estimate the propensity scores for partici-
pation in the respective program versus non-participation using probit-estimation. We test
diﬀerent speciﬁcations following economic theory and previous empirical ﬁndings as dis-
cussed above. But we also check econometric indicators such as signiﬁcance of parameters
or pseudo-R2 to ﬁnd the ﬁnal speciﬁcation.11 The results of the probit-estimation can be
found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Let us brieﬂy discuss the main components that inﬂu-
ence the selection into treatment. In particular, variables such as age, duration of previous
unemployment, regional cluster, information with respect to previous earnings and the in-
tergenerational transmission turn out to be most important for the selection into SUS. In
the case of “BA vs. NP”, the duration of previous unemployment, indicators for the labor
market history and also parental self-employment have a signiﬁcant impact. This actually
conﬁrms our expectation that individuals with higher previous earnings are more likely to
choose BA. In addition, we also provide the distribution of the estimated propensity scores
in Figure A.1 in the Appendix. As we can see, the distribution of the propensity scores are
biased towards the tails, that is participants have a higher probability on overage of be-
coming self-employed than non-participants. Nevertheless, participant’s propensity score
distribution overlaps the region of the propensity scores of non-participants completely;
therefore, the overlap assumption is fulﬁlled.
11For a more extensive discussion on the estimation of propensity scores, we refer to Heckman, Ichimura,
Smith, and Todd (1998) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) among others.
11In the next step we estimate the average treatment eﬀects on the treated as depicted in
Equation 2. In order to increase eﬃciency and being able to apply bootstrapping for infer-
ence we use a kernel matching algorithm.12 To assess the matching quality, that is, whether
the matching procedure balances the distribution of observable variables between partic-
ipants and non-participants, Table A.3 summarizes diﬀerent quality measures.13 First of
all, we provide in the upper part the number of variables which diﬀer signiﬁcantly be-
tween participants and non-participants by using a t-test.14 For instance, we can see that
for SUS, 28 variables have a mean that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between treated and non-
treated at the 5% level before matching takes place. In the matched sample in turn, only
two variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for treated and non-treated individuals. In fact,
in the case of BA after matching, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences at all. This indicates
that matching has been successful. Since using a t-test to assess the matching quality does
not tell us anything about the bias reduction, we also provide the mean standardized bias
(MSB) and the number of variables with a standardized bias of a certain amount. It can
be seen that in case of “SUS vs. NP” (“BA vs. NP”) the MSB declines from initially
14.6% to 3.5% (8.6% to 2.2%) after matching, where a MSB below 3% to 5% generally
indicates a success of the matching approach (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Finally, we
also re-estimate the propensity scores within the matched sample, as suggested by Sianesi
(2004). The distribution of covariates should be well balanced within the matched sample
and hence the resulting pseudo-R2 from the propensity score estimation should be rather
low. In fact, we do observe a sharp drop in pseudo-R2 for both programs also suggesting
a successful matching.
4 Results
The aim of the programs is to integrate unemployed individuals in the labor market and
to increase income levels. Therefore, we use diﬀerent outcome variables for the calculation
of causal eﬀects. We employ “not unemployed” and “self-employed or regularly employed”
as binary outcome variables to measure the degree of labor market integration. This is
due to two reasons. First, non-participants are less likely to become self-employed than
participants; and hence, comparing participants and non-participants with respect to self-
employment only would bias the causal eﬀects upwards. Second, the main objective of
ALMP is to integrate individuals into the labor market which includes being regularly
employed as a success. We also want to highlight that being not registered as unemployed
captures an upper bound estimation for the degree of labor market integration, i.e., in-
dependence of unemployment or social beneﬁts. The binary outcome variables take on
12More speciﬁcally, we apply an Epanechnikov Kernel with an bandwidth of 0.06. We run diﬀerent
matching algorithm and ﬁnd that our results are not sensitive. Furthermore, we applied inverse probability
weighting (IPW) as an alternative approach for estimating ATT, as suggested by Imbens (2004). This
method also relies on the CIA. Using IPW, we ﬁnd hardly any substantial diﬀerences for the employment
eﬀects but slightly higher income eﬀects.
13For a more intensive discussion with respect to assessing the matching quality, we refer to Caliendo
and Kopeinig (2008).
14We consider the distribution of observable characteristics between participants and non-participants
before and after matching based on 56 variables in total.
12the value one if the individual is either “not unemployed” or “self-employed or regularly
employed” and zero otherwise. Moreover, we use “working income” and “total income”
as continuous outcome variables to ﬁgure out whether program participation leads to an
increase in income levels.
In the following, we ﬁrst discuss the causal eﬀects of SUS and BA with respect to the
predeﬁned outcome variables in Section 4.1. Afterwards, we consider eﬀect heterogeneity
in Section 4.2 to investigate for which subgroups both programs are in particular suc-
cessful. Finally, Section 4.3 veriﬁes the validity of our results with respect to unobserved
heterogeneity.
4.1 Main Results
Figure 1 shows the average treatment eﬀect on the treated as deﬁned in Equation 2 over
time and Table 6 provides the corresponding exact values for selected points in time. As
one can see in Figure 1, the eﬀects are positive and signiﬁcant at all times for either out-
come variable. To be precise, 56 months after start-up, participants in SUS (BA) have
a 15.6% (10.6%) higher probability of not being registered as unemployed compared to
non-participants. Regarding integration into the labor market, that is being either self-
employed or regularly employed, we detect that the employment probability of participants
is 22.1 percentage points higher for SUS and 14.5 percentage points for BA participants in
comparison to non-participants. These strong positive long-run eﬀects are remarkable com-
pared to ﬁndings of evaluation studies investigating other programs of ALMP in Germany,
such as vocational training or job creation schemes.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Moreover, for BA the positive eﬀect seems to be rather stable after three years fol-
lowing start-up, indicating that either surviving ﬁrms or employed individuals are well
integrated in the (labor) market. For individuals supported with SUS, we do not ﬁnd such
a convergence. We argue that due to ﬁnancial support which lasted longer, the adjustment
process at the market is still ongoing. Because of this and the fact that the control group
for BA participants is more competitive in the labor market than the assigned control
group for SUS participants, the higher eﬀects for SUS can not be directly contrasted to
the results of BA participants. In Table 6, we also provide the cumulated eﬀects over
time which reveal that within our observation period of 56 months, participants in SUS
(BA) spent on average 23.5 (14.6) months more in self-employment or regular employ-
ment than non-participants. One may argue that cumulating the eﬀects over the entire
period will capture locking-in eﬀects and lead to an overestimation of the eﬀects, since
participants received ﬁnancial support. We take care of this by providing “partly” cu-
mulated eﬀects, for which we cumulate the eﬀects only over the period after ﬁnancial
support ended. For the case of SUS, we ﬁnd that participants are still on average 5.5
months longer self-employed or regularly employed than non-participants which actually
depicts 20% of the post-program period of 20 months. For BA participants, we ﬁnd a
partly cumulated eﬀect of 10.8 months, which is also 20% of the remaining period (of 50
13months in this case). To shed light on the question of income gains for participants, we
provide the causal eﬀects for income diﬀerences at the end of the observation period at the
bottom of Table 6. The results unambiguously show that participants earn signiﬁcantly
more than non-participants. Participants in SUS (BA) earn on average, e435 (e618) more
per month than non-participants at the end of our observation period. When compared
to the monthly net income of participants and non-participants (see again Table 4) these
are economically very signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Insert Table 6 about here
In addition to our matching results, Table 6 also provides the cumulated employment
and income eﬀects for the conditional DID estimator as deﬁned in Equation 4. As we
can see the results hardly diﬀer. For instance, for the case of “BA vs. NP” we ﬁnd par-
ticipants being on average 14.6 months longer in employment or self-employment than
non-participants using the total cumulated eﬀect. Using conditional DID, the results vary
from 14.1 to 14.6. The income eﬀects are also very close to the matching results. This
evidence indicates that controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity does not
add essential information and consequently suggests that the CIA seems to be a reasonable
assumption for our analysis. We also estimated the optimal subpopulation average treat-
ment eﬀects (OSATE) as suggested by Crump, Hotz, Imbens, and Mitnik (2009) where we
restrict the analysis to a subset of the original sample and drop individuals with covariate
values that are outside the optimal common support range. We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
diﬀerences to our main results.15
In summary, our results suggest that supporting unemployed individuals by SUS or
BA has been a success in terms of both employment prospects as well as income measures
compared to non-participation.
4.2 Eﬀects for Subgroups: Eﬀect Heterogeneity
In the following, we take a closer look on eﬀect heterogeneity. This is in particularly in-
sightful when determining the type of individuals who beneﬁt most from participation.
Disadvantaged groups in the labor market, such as low educated or young individuals,
are likely to face limited job oﬀers and the opportunity of becoming self-employed de-
picts a chance to escape unemployment. Additionally, self-employment might also be an
alternative for individuals who are potentially discriminated in dependent employment,
for example if their work is not valued high enough (see Clark and Drinkwater, 2000, for
some evidence regarding ethnic minorties in the UK). We also have to take into account,
that more educated unemployed individuals with past working experience have a relatively
high probability of ﬁnding dependent employment again. Therefore, the distance between
participants and matched non-participants in terms of labor market perspectives should
be rather small. Taken together, this leads us to expect that the net eﬀects of start-up
programs (when compared to non-participation) are highest for disadvantaged individuals.
15Restricting the estimation sample in such a way lowers external validity of the estimate, but probably
enhances internal validity (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2008). Results are available upon request from the
authors.
14To answer the question of who beneﬁts most, we conduct the complete estimation
procedure, that is propensity score estimation and kernel-matching, for diﬀerent subgroups
of our sample with respect to educational attainment, professional qualiﬁcation, age and
nationality. The results are summarized in Table A.4, in which the upper part depicts the
eﬀects for the whole sample.
First of all, consider the results stratiﬁed by educational attainment. We split the
sample into high (completed upper secondary school) and low (no degree, lower or mid-
dle secondary school) educated individuals. It can be seen that low educated participants
perform better in both programs in terms of employment prospects; the total cumulated
eﬀect is about 5 months larger than for high educated individuals. This is mainly driven
by the fact that the control group of the highly educated have a higher probability of being
employed at all times than the respective low educated comparison group. We illustrate
that in Figure A.2 by showing the levels for the outcome variable “self-employment or
regular employment” among participants and non-participants within the matched sam-
ple; the diﬀerence between the respective solid and dashed line corresponds to the ATT
presented in Table A.4. This conﬁrms our expectation that the low educated control group
performs relatively worse and consequently the eﬀects are bigger for that group. Hence,
oﬀering individuals with bad labor market prospects the opportunity to turn unemploy-
ment into self-employment can be considered an eﬀective strategy. The income eﬀects in
Table A.4 do not reveal such obvious patterns. In the case of “SUS vs. NP” the low ed-
ucated participants yield much higher income eﬀects compared to non-participation than
the highly educated do. For the comparison “BA vs. NP” it is the reverse, that is the
highly educated are better oﬀ than their low educated counterparts. This suggests that
highly educated BA recipients who survived in self-employment are also very successful
in terms of income. Furthermore, we conduct a separate analysis for diﬀerent levels of
professional qualiﬁcation. Here we deﬁne all individuals with tertiary or technical college
education as highly qualiﬁed; whilst skilled or unskilled workers are low qualiﬁed. As we
can see in Table A.4 the eﬀect pattern is very similar to the one of educational attainment
(because professional qualiﬁcation and educational attainment are highly correlated).
We also conduct the analysis separately for individuals aged 30 or younger as well as
for individuals above the age of 30. Here, the employment eﬀects of the two programs go
in opposing directions. The results suggest that SUS tends to be more eﬀective for partici-
pants above the age of 30; whereas BA seems to be more eﬀective for younger participants.
Figure A.2 reveals that this is again mainly due to diﬀerent labor market performance of
the respective control groups. For both programs, there is hardly any diﬀerence between
the program participants, that is the solid lines almost overlap. However, in the case of
SUS controls, a considerable higher share of young controls is employed or self-employed
and the reverse applies for BA. Probably more experienced (>30 years) BA controls are
more likely to be employed or self-employed which seems reasonable given that BA at-
tracts rather highly educated individuals with higher earnings in the past (see Section
3.1). Apparently, for these individuals experience is important in order to ﬁnd a job in
the labor market and therefore older BA control individuals perform better in the labor
market. On the other hand, low educated individuals with bad labor market performance
15in the past (mainly attracted by SUS) have fewer opportunities in the labor market the
older they are. The income eﬀects are consistently higher for younger individuals.
Finally, we stratify the analysis with respect to German or non-German citizenship
and ﬁnd higher employment eﬀects for natives. Figure A.2 shows that the higher eﬀects
for natives are driven by the success of the participants. It can be seen that control groups
do not really diﬀer for both groups. This in turn suggests that SUS and BA seem to be
even more eﬀective for German participants. Additionally, natives achieve higher income
eﬀects even though they are not signiﬁcant for the SUS case.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 exempliﬁes our ﬁndings with respect to eﬀect heterogeneity and depicts the
eﬀects of program participation conditional on labor market perspectives without pro-
gram participation. Therefore, we contrast cumulated average treatment eﬀects for the
outcome variable “self-employment or regular employment” (horizontal axis) to the av-
erage months spent in “self-employment or regular employment” among matched non-
participants (vertical axis), which is supposed to reﬂect the labor market perspectives
in case of non-participation. The scatter plot clearly indicates a negative relationship,
underscoring the ﬁnding that groups with bad labor market perspectives beneﬁt most.
For instance, for individuals with high education/high qualiﬁcation the estimated eﬀects
(horizontal axis) of the programs are rather small, however, for the opposite case—low
education/low qualiﬁcation—the eﬀects are large. This suggests that SUS and BA are
most eﬀective for particular disadvantaged groups who face limited options in dependent
employment. As previously mentioned, such groups are at high risk of becoming long-term
unemployed; and therefore, these ALMP programs potentially contribute to the reduction
of long-term unemployment amongst disadvantaged unemployed.
4.3 Sensitivity to Unobserved Heterogeneity
After having presented strong positive eﬀects for both programs, we now check the ro-
bustness of our results with respect to deviations from our identifying assumption. If
participants and non-participants diﬀer in terms of unobserved characteristics, the CIA
is violated and therefore our results are biased. Using the DID estimator in Section 4.1
already relaxed the identifying assumption by allowing for time-invariant unobservable
diﬀerences between both groups. Since it is not possible to test the CIA directly with
non-experimental data; we now use a bounding approach initially suggested by Rosen-
baum (2002). This approach consists of simulating an unobserved component and testing
to which degree of unobserved heterogeneity results are robust. It should be clear that this
approach does not answer the question whether or not the CIA is fulﬁlled but conveys
information on the robustness of the results with respect to unobserved heterogeneity.
The main idea is that in the presence of unobserved factors, identical individuals with
respect to observable characteristics (Wi) have diﬀerent probabilities of receiving treat-
ment. Therefore, an artiﬁcial factor Γ is introduced to simulate an unobserved term. The
16underlying test statistic then tests up to which extent this unobserved factor Γ will inﬂu-
ence the signiﬁcance of the results (see Becker and Caliendo, 2007, for more details on the
implementation of the test procedure and the STATA module mhbounds.ado).
We ﬁnd strong positive eﬀects for both programs and therefore we are only interested
in the test-statistic for the upper bound under the assumption that we have overestimated
the treatment eﬀect. In other words, if unobserved factors lead to positive selection, i.e.,
those who participate always have a higher employment probability even in the absence
of treatment, the test statistic Q+ will become insigniﬁcant for a certain value of Γ. To
ease the interpretation we also provide respective p-values (p+).
Table A.5 summarizes test statistics separately for the outcome variables “not unem-
ployed” and “self-employment or regular employment” and for “SUS vs. NP” and “BA vs.
NP.” We consider the outcome variables after 36 months since start-up in the upper part
of Table A.5 and after 56 months in the lower part.16 Below the detailed test-statistics and
respective p-values we provide the exact values of Γ at which results turn insigniﬁcant.
First of all, in the case of the absence of unobserved heterogeneity, that is Γ = 1.0, we can
see that the test statistic for the upper bounds are signiﬁcant throughout, indicated by
p+ < 0.05. Starting from that point, we stepwise increase the value of Γ. As mentioned
above, this actually simulates an ascending inﬂuence of unobserved factors. For the com-
parison “BA vs. NP” results are very robust against strong unobserved selection bias; up
to Γ = 3 results remain signiﬁcant. This implies that unobserved factors would need to
have twice the inﬂuence (on selection and outcomes) as Wi in order to undermine the
results. For the comparison “SUS vs. NP” on the other hand, results are slightly more
sensitive with critical values of 1.25 and 1.30 after 56 months. While this does not mean
that there is unobserved heterogeneity inﬂuencing our results, this does call for a cautious
interpretation of the results for SUS.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀects of two programs designed to turn unemployment
into self-employment in West Germany. The programs diﬀer in their design and attract
diﬀerent types of persons. Individuals participating in the bridging allowance are more
educated and have higher earnings in the past; whereas SUS participants are on average
less educated and have a relatively poor previous labor market performance. Using an
unique data set consisting of administrative and survey data, we are able to add two
substantial aspects to previous literature: First of all, we observe individuals for nearly
ﬁve years following start-up, such that we are able to provide ﬁrst evidence on the long-
term eﬀects of these programs (especially for industrialized countries). Second, we carefully
consider eﬀect heterogeneity in order to determine for which groups programs work best.
We base our analysis on conditional propensity score matching methods to assess the
eﬀectiveness of SUS and BA against non-participation. In particular, we use the proba-
bility of being employed (either self-employed or as an employee) and personal income
16We also conducted the test for diﬀerent points in time but the results hardly diﬀer.
17as outcome variables. The results show that both programs are eﬀective with respect to
employment probabilities. Participants in SUS (BA) spend signiﬁcant amounts of time
longer in employment or self-employment than non-participants. Our results also unam-
biguously show that participants earn signiﬁcantly more than non-participants. To validate
our ﬁndings, we conduct sensitivity checks with respect to unobserved heterogeneity and
ﬁnd that our results are robust. Additionally, self-employed participants are also more sat-
isﬁed with their self-employment compared to previous dependent employment. Regarding
eﬀect heterogeneity, we estimate causal eﬀects for diﬀerent subgroups stratiﬁed by educa-
tional attainment, professional qualiﬁcation, age and nationality. The results suggest that
both programs are especially eﬀective for low educated and low qualiﬁed individuals; with
respect to nationality and age results are mixed.
Overall, we ﬁnd persistent positive long-run eﬀects of SUS and BA on the employment
situation of former unemployed individuals. This is particularly true for individuals who are
at high risk of being excluded from the labor market and becoming long-term unemployed.
Following the concept of Sen (1997), SUS and BA helped abolish labor market barriers for
disadvantaged groups and sustainably integrated those into the labor market. Potentially,
both programs are appropriate for ﬁghting long-term unemployment, social exclusion and
therefore poverty.
However, we also need to point out some limitations of our study and outline further
research needed. First of all, it needs to be emphasized that we do a partial-equilibrium
analysis focussing on the eﬀects for participating individuals. Any general equilibrium or
macroeconomic impacts can not be considered in this setting. This is especially true for
substitution eﬀects and crowding-out eﬀects. Hence, our positive ﬁndings (on an individ-
ual level) need to be veriﬁed on a macroeconomic level in order to judge the scope of the
programs to generate any positive macro eﬀects. Second, it has often been argued that
individuals who participate in start-up programs and become self-employed have charac-
teristics (observed and/or unobserved) which make them diﬀerent from other unemployed
individuals. We address the selection issue by relying on a very informative dataset and
applying conditional propensity score matching methods. This takes care for selection on
observable and time-invariant unobservable characteristics. Additionally, we test the sen-
sitivity of our results with respect to deviations from the identifying assumptions using a
bounding approach and results turn out to be robust. Clearly, if there is any unobserved
selection on top of this, which we are not able to pick up, we have an upward bias in the
estimated treatment eﬀects. Finally, it should also be clear that the data at hand does not
allow to compare subsidized start-ups out of unemployment with other start-ups. To do
so, we would need information on “regular” start-ups (unsubsidized, out of employment).
This is one area of further research as is the question which of the two programs performs
better. To analyze the latter, participants in both programs need to be compared directly
which would also allow to reveal the scope of additional job creation by subsidized ﬁrms.
Finally, investigating the eﬀects for groups neglected here—women and the East German
labor market—will allow to give a more complete picture of the performance of these two
programs.
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21Tables and Figures
Table 1: Terms and Conditions of Programs
Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Entry conditions: -Unemployment beneﬁt receipt
-Income is restricted to e25,000 per
year
-Approval of a business plan was
subsequently introduced in Novem-
ber 2004
-Below 65 years of age
-Unemployment beneﬁt entitlement
-No income restrictions
-Approval of the business plan
-Below 65 years of age
Support: -Participants receive a ﬁxed sum of
e600 in the ﬁrst year, e360 (e240)
in the second (third) year
-Claim has to be renewed every year
-Participants receive UB for six
months
-To cover social security liabilities,
an additional lump sum of 68.5% is
granted
Others: -Participants have to become a
member in the state pension insur-
ance and take advantage of a re-
duced rate in the legal health insur-
ance
-Social security is left to the indi-
vidual’s discretion
Source: Social Act III, §57 - Bridging Allowance, §421I - Start-up Subsidy.
Table 2: Entries into ALMP Programs in West Ger-
many (in thousands)
BA SUS New SUS VT TM WS
2000 92.6 – – 337.9 285.9 120.4
2001 64.5 – – 261.2 338.5 101.0
2002 89.0 – – 273.2 545.4 114.4
2003 114.4 64.2 – 154.0 694.3 96.5
2004 137.3 113.8 – 124.0 788.5 93.9
2005 120.0 57.3 – 91.1 607.2 86.0
2006 83.6 27.0 25.4 173.0 671.1 152.1
2007 – – 96.5 246.2 719.1 160.7
Source: Federal Employment Agency (various issues).
Note: BA - Bridging Allowance, SUS - Start-up Subsidy, VT
- Vocational Training, TM - Training Measures, WS - Wage
Subsidy.
22Table 3: Number of Realized Interviews
SUS BA NP
January/February 2005 1,116 1,665 2,530
January/February 2006 811 1,207 1,448
May/June 2008 486 780 929
Note: See Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008) for
more details on the construction of the data and de-
tailed information with respect to the ﬁrst and sec-
ond interview waves. A minor part of the third wave
interviews (4%) took place in July 2008.
Table 4: Descriptive Evidence on Labor Market Status and Income
Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance Non-Participants
Labor market status
2nd interview (January/February 2006)
Self-employed 67.6 71.5 12.7
Regularly employed 11.7 14.0 35.9
Unemployed or in ALMP 15.2 11.1 35.9
Others 5.6 3.4 15.5
3rd interview (May/June 2008)
Self-employed 59.7 67.9 14.1
Regularly employed 20.9 21.1 49.1
Unemployed or in ALMP 11.7 6.7 19.9
Others 7.6 4.3 16.9
Income
a) at 3rd interview (May/June 2008)
Total income 1,672.0 2,336.0 1,581.1
(1,720.4) (1,962.9) (1,601.6)
[1,276.3] [1,942.3] [1,338.0]
Working income 1,498.5 2,167.4 1,302.8
(1,780.2) (2,006.3) (1,662.5)
[1,145.3] [1,815.2] [1,190.1]
Note: Numbers are percentages unless otherwise stated.
a) Income is depicted as average monthly net income in euros; standard deviation and median are
provided in parentheses and square brackets respectively.
Table 5: Comparison to Previous Dependent Employment
Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Type of activity 0.6 0.5
Income 0.2 0.2
Promotion prospects 0.5 0.5
Workload -0.1 -0.1
Working time -0.2 -0.3
Social security -0.2 -0.3
Note: Only self-employed individuals after 56 months since start-up. Scale:
Improved (1), Unchanged (0), Declined (-1).
23Table 6: Causal Eﬀects of Start-up Subsidy and Bridging Allowance
Start-up Subsidy vs. Bridging Allowance vs.
Non-Participation Non-Participants
Outcome variable: “Not unemployed”
Diﬀerence in percentage points
After 6 months 59.4 (3.0) 49.3 (2.8)
After 36 months 22.9 (3.4) 10.9 (1.8)
After 56 months 15.6 (2.9) 10.6 (1.8)
Diﬀerence in months
Total cumulated eﬀect (
P56
t=1) 18.7 (1.3) 12.2 (0.8)
DID1 17.7 (1.2) 12.2 (0.8)
DID2 17.9 (1.3) 11.7 (0.7)
DID3 16.9 (1.5) 11.7 (0.7)
Partly cumulated eﬀect
a) 3.9 (0.6) 8.5 (0.7)
DID1 2.9 (0.7) 8.5 (0.7)
DID2 3.1 (0.8) 8.0 (0.7)
DID3 2.1 (1.2) 8.0 (0.7)
Outcome variable: “Self-employment or regular employment”
Diﬀerence in percentage points
After 6 months 68.5 (2.6) 55.0 (2.5)
After 36 months 29.4 (3.3) 15.3 (2.1)
After 56 months 22.1 (3.4) 14.5 (1.9)
Diﬀerence in months
Total cumulated eﬀect (
P56
t=1) 23.5 (1.3) 14.6 (0.9)
DID1 22.6 (1.3) 14.6 (0.9)
DID2 22.7 (1.4) 14.1 (0.9)
DID3 21.7 (1.4) 14.1 (0.9)
Partly cumulated eﬀect
a) 5.5 (0.6) 10.8 (0.9)
DID1 4.5 (0.8) 10.8 (0.8)
DID2 4.6 (0.7) 10.2 (0.9)
DID3 3.7 (1.0) 10.2 (0.8)
Outcome variable: “Income 56 months after start-up”
Diﬀerence in e/month
Working income 435 (135) 618 (110)
DID4 475 (130) 656 (128)
Total income 270 (121) 485 (110)
DID5 288 (139) 480 (128)
Note: Depicted are average treatment eﬀects on the treated as the diﬀerence in outcome
variables between participants and non-participants. Standard errors are in parentheses
and are based on bootstrapping with 200 replications.
Reference level for pre-treatment period: DID1: Jan. 2001 - June 2003; DID2: July 1998
- Dec. 2000; DID3: July 1998 - June 2003; DID4: average monthly total income in 2002;






24Figure 1: Causal Eﬀects of Start-up Subsidy and Bridging Allowance Over Time
Outcome variable: “Not unemployed”
Start-up Subsidy vs. Non-Participation Bridging Allowance vs. Non-Participation
Outcome variable: “Self-employment or regular employment”
Start-up Subsidy vs. Non-Participation Bridging Allowance vs. Non-Participation
Note: Depicted are average treatment eﬀects on the treated (solid line), i.e., the diﬀerence in outcome vari-
ables between participants and non-participants. In addition, we provide 5% conﬁdence intervals (dashed
lines), which are based on bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications.
25Figure 2: Eﬀect Heterogeneity Conditional on Labor Market Perspectives Among Matched
Non-Participants
Outcome variable: “Self-employment or regular employment”
Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Note: Depicted on the horizontal axis are the cumulated average treatment eﬀects on the treated consistent to Table
A.4 for the outcome variable “self-employment or regular employment”. On the vertical axis we provide the average
months spent in “self-employment or regular employment” within the observation period of 56 months for the matched
non-participants.
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a) 472 756 853
Age (in years) 38.86 40.17 39.75
(9.78) (8.66) (8.88)
Age bracket
18 to 24 years 0.068 0.026 0.049
25 to 29 years 0.131 0.095 0.095
30 to 34 years 0.174 0.126 0.130
35 to 39 years 0.153 0.242 0.212
40 to 44 years 0.176 0.200 0.210
45 to 49 years 0.127 0.160 0.165
50 to 64 years 0.172 0.151 0.138
Marital status (Ref.: Single)
Married 0.472 0.648 0.594
Number of children in household
No children 0.708 0.595 0.639
1 child 0.144 0.155 0.145
2 or more children 0.148 0.250 0.216
Health restriction that aﬀect job placement (Ref.: No)
Yes 0.078 0.033 0.057
Nationality (Ref.: German)
Non-German 0.328 0.265 0.249
Desired working time (Ref.: Part-time)
Full-time 0.977 0.992 0.984
School achievement
None 0.028 0.007 0.014
Lower secondary school 0.405 0.290 0.370
Middle secondary school 0.250 0.233 0.223
Specialized upper secondary school 0.104 0.193 0.150
Upper secondary school 0.214 0.278 0.243
Occupational group
Manufacturing 0.040 0.011 0.018
Agriculture 0.333 0.233 0.277
Technical occupations 0.038 0.160 0.108
Services 0.517 0.565 0.539
Others 0.072 0.032 0.059
Professional qualiﬁcation
Workers with tertiary education 0.123 0.259 0.200
Workers with technical college education 0.068 0.112 0.106
Skilled workers 0.559 0.515 0.549
Unskilled workers 0.250 0.114 0.145
Duration of previous unemployment
< 1 month 0.133 0.074 0.014
≥ 1 month - < 3 months 0.150 0.222 0.223
≥ 3 months - < 6 months 0.212 0.249 0.251
≥ 6 months - < 1 year 0.288 0.316 0.339
≥ 1 year - < 2 years 0.155 0.124 0.150
≥ 2 years 0.061 0.015 0.023
Professional experience (Ref.: Without professional experience)
With professional experience 0.824 0.860 0.877




Duration of last employment (in months) 32.394 54.041 41.963
(40.987) (54.358) (49.076)
Number of placement oﬀers 5.367 3.758 5.181
(8.563) (6.921) (7.664)
Daily income from regular employment in the ﬁrst half of 2003 (in euros) 9.969 25.783 20.700
(21.571) (41.503) (34.970)
Unemployment beneﬁt level (in euros) 24.363 40.405 33.167
(11.436) (15.275) (14.322)
Remaining unemployment beneﬁt entitlement (in months) 4.752 7.317 7.054
(5.759) (6.380) (6.397)
Employment status before job-seeking
Employment 0.591 0.782 0.769
Self-employed 0.053 0.024 0.036
School attendance/never employed before/apprenticeship 0.123 0.073 0.063
Unemployable 0.083 0.042 0.059
Other, but employed at least once before 0.131 0.070 0.066
Other 0.019 0.009 0.007
Regional cluster
II a 0.013 0.024 0.028
II b 0.153 0.159 0.135
III a 0.127 0.071 0.088
III b 0.083 0.091 0.110
III c 0.222 0.237 0.244
IV 0.127 0.144 0.117
V a 0.036 0.042 0.038
V b 0.165 0.148 0.176
V c 0.074 0.083 0.064
Intergenerational transmission
Parents are/were self-employed 0.284 0.284 0.155
Note: Numbers are percentages unless otherwise stated. Measured in the third quarter 2003; standard deviation in parentheses.
a) Diﬀerences to realized interviews in Table 3 are due to missing information in the administrative data for some individuals.
28Table A.2: Propensity Score Estimation
Start-up Subsidy vs. Bridging Allowance vs.
Non-Participation Non-Participation
Age bracket (Ref.: 18 to 24 years)
25 to 29 years 0.430
∗∗ 0.354
∗
30 to 34 years 0.508
∗∗ 0.254
35 to 39 years 0.266 0.291
40 to 44 years 0.361
∗ 0.119
45 to 49 years 0.433
∗∗ 0.196
50 to 64 years 0.863
∗∗∗ 0.316
Marital status (Ref.: Single
Married −0.098 0.009
Number of children in household (Ref.: No children)
one child 0.184 −0.105
Two or more children 0.089 −0.160





Desired working time (Ref.: Part-time)
Full-time −0.037 0.135
School achievement (Ref.: None)
Lower secondary school −0.081 0.228
Middle secondary school 0.069 0.293
Specialized upper secondary school −0.063 0.333
Upper secondary school 0.038 0.288







Professional qualiﬁcation (Ref.: Workers with tertiary education)
Workers with technical college education 0.126 −0.038
Skilled workers 0.071 0.042
Unskilled workers 0.198 0.066
Duration of previous unemployment (Ref.: < 1 month)
≥ 1 month - 3 months −1.634
∗∗∗ −0.893
∗∗∗
≥ 3 months - < 6 months −1.488
∗∗∗ −0.943
∗∗∗
≥ 6 months - < 1 year −1.639
∗∗∗ −1.069
∗∗∗
≥ 1 year - < 2 years −1.765
∗∗∗ −1.118
∗∗∗
≥ 2 years −1.316
∗∗∗ −1.145
∗∗∗
Professional experience (Ref.: without professional experience)
with professional experience −0.123 −0.251
∗∗
Duration of last employment (in months) 0.001 0.002
∗∗
Number of placement oﬀers −0.006 −0.010
∗∗
Remaining unemployment beneﬁt entitlement (in months) −0.028
∗∗∗ −0.024
∗∗∗
Unemployment beneﬁt level (in euros) −0.029
∗∗∗ 0.024
∗∗∗
Daily income from regular employment in the ﬁrst half of 2003 (in euros) −0.002 −0.002
∗
Employment status before job-seeking (Ref.: Employment)
Self-employed 0.290 −0.373
∗
School attendance/never employed before/apprenticeship 0.362
∗∗ 0.225
Unemployable 0.197 −0.072




Table to be continued.
29Table A.2 continued.
Start-up Subsidy vs. Bridging Allowance vs.
Non-Participation Non-Participation





























Note: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% signiﬁcance level.
Table A.3: Matching Quality
Start-up Subsidy Bridging Allowance
Before matching After matching Before matching After matching
t-test of equal means
a)
1%-level 19 0 9 0
5%-level 28 0 15 0
10%-level 33 0 17 0
Standardized bias
Mean standardized bias 14.550 3.539 8.565 2.194
Number of variables with standardized bias of a certain amount
< 1% 2 12 3 22
1% until < 3% 4 14 11 18
3% until < 5% 4 14 6 7
5% until < 10% 15 15 21 9
≥ 10% 31 1 15 0
Pseudo-R
2 0.196 0.013 0.105 0.007
a) Depicted is the number of variables which diﬀer signiﬁcantly between treated and controls. The decision is
based on a simple t-test of equal means. There are 56 observable variables in total.
30Table A.4: Eﬀect Heterogeneity: Causal Eﬀects of Start-up Subsidy and Bridging
Allowance
Start-up Subsidy vs. Bridging Allowance vs.
Non-Participation Non-Participants
Main results
# Treated 472 756
# Controls 853 853
Self-employed or regularly employed
After 36 months (in %-points) 29.4 15.3
After 56 months (in %-points) 22.1 14.5
Total cumulated eﬀect (
P56
t=1, in months) 23.5 14.6
Working income (t=56, in e/month) 435 618
Educational level
Low High Low High
# Treated 322 150 400 356
# Controls 518 335 518 335
Self-employed or regularly employed
After 36 months (in %-points) 29.6 25.5 20.0 10.6
After 56 months (in %-points) 23.7 17.6 19.2 11.7
Total cumulated eﬀect (
P56
t=1, in months) 24.5 19.0 17.1 12.8
Working income (t=56, in e/month) 616 (-100) 416 768
Professional qualiﬁcation
Low High Low High
# Treated 382 90 475 281
# Controls 592 261 592 261
Self-employed or regularly employed
After 36 months (in %-points) 27.3 16.3 15.8 12.7
After 56 months (in %-points) 20.5 11.5 17.1 12.4
Total cumulated eﬀect (
P56
t=1, in months) 23.5 15.4 16.1 12.5
Working income (t=56, in e/month) 628 -464 486 865
Age
≤ 30 > 30 ≤ 30 > 30
# Treated 112 360 110 646
# Controls 141 712 141 712
Self-employed or regularly employed
After 36 months (in %-points) 21.9 27.0 20.1 15.7
After 56 months (in %-points) (8.7) 21.3 10.5 16.2
Total cumulated eﬀect (
P56
t=1, in months) 17.9 23.4 18.7 14.8
Working income (t=56, in e/month) 543 374 914 573
Table to be continued.
31Table A.4 continued.
Start-up Subsidy vs. Bridging Allowance vs.
Non-Participation Non-Participants
Nationality
Native Non-German Native Non-German
# Treated 317 155 556 200
# Controls 641 212 641 261
Self-employed or regularly employed
After 36 months (in %-points) 27.3 20.6 15.9 10.6
After 56 months (in %-points) 20.0 15.7 14.2 14.5
Total cumulated eﬀect (
P56
t=1, in months) 22.0 21.1 15.3 12.4
Working income (t=56, in e/month) (305) (249) 612 587
Note: Depicted are average treatment eﬀects on the treated as the diﬀerence in outcome variables between
participants and non-participants. The educational level is decomposed into “high” education, capturing
individuals who have successfully completed upper secondary school, and “low” education, including indi-
viduals who have either not completed school or have completed lower or middle secondary school. With
respect to professional qualiﬁcations we deﬁne individuals with tertiary or technical college education
as “highly” qualiﬁed, while skilled or unskilled workers are categorized as “low” qualiﬁed. Eﬀects which
are not signiﬁcant diﬀerent from zero at the 5%-level are in parentheses; standard errors are based on
bootstrapping with 200 replications.
Table A.5: Unobserved Heterogeneity: Mhbounds
Γ Not-unemployed Self-employment or regular employment










After 36 months since start-up
1.00 4.964 0.000 7.894 0.000 6.782 0.000 10.631 0.000
1.25 3.591 0.000 6.348 0.000 5.186 0.000 8.833 0.000
1.50 2.490 0.006 5.119 0.000 3.904 0.000 7.400 0.000
1.75 1.569 0.058 4.102 0.000 2.833 0.002 6.213 0.000
2.00 0.777 0.219 3.233 0.001 1.913 0.028 5.200 0.000
Critical values
1% 1.50 - 1.55 2.30 - 2.35 1.85 - 1.90 2.90 - 2.95
5% 1.70 - 1.75 2.55 - 2.60 2.05 - 2.10 —
10% 1.80 - 1.85 2.70 - 2.75 2.15 - 2.20 —
After 56 months since start-up
1.00 3.721 0.000 8.596 0.000 4.473 0.000 10.332 0.000
1.25 2.355 0.009 7.163 0.000 2.862 0.002 8.616 0.000
1.50 1.252 0.105 6.034 0.000 1.558 0.060 7.254 0.000
1.75 0.325 0.372 5.107 0.000 0.460 0.323 6.128 0.000
2.00 0.307 0.379 4.321 0.000 0.346 0.364 5.169 0.000
Critical values
1% 1.25 - 1.30 2.80 - 2.85 1.30 - 1.35 —
5% 1.40 - 1.45 — 1.45 - 1.50 —
10% 1.45 - 1.50 — 1.55 - 1.60 —
Note: Reported results are achieved by using mhbounds.ado (see Becker and Caliendo,
2007). Critical values are related to the exact values of Γ at which results turn insigniﬁcant.
BA - Bridging Allowance, SUS - Start-up Subsidy, NP - Non-Participation.
32Figure A.1: Propensity Score Distributions
Start-up Subsidy vs. Non-Participation
Bridging Allowance vs. Non-Participation
Participants Non-Participants
Note: These are propensity score distributions for participants and non-
participants based on estimations in Table A.2.
33Figure A.2: Eﬀect Heterogeneity: Probability Levels Among Participants and
Non-Participants
Start-up Subsidy vs. Non-Participation Bridging Allowance vs. Non-Participation
Educational level (low–black / high–gray)
Professional qualiﬁcation (low–black / high–gray)
Age (≤30–black / >30–gray)
Nationality (German–black / Non-German–gray)
—– Treated Controls - - -
Note: Depicted are probability levels for the outcome variable “self-employment or regular
employment” among participants and non-participants within the matched sample, i.e., the
diﬀerence between the solid and dashed line is the average treatment eﬀect on the treated.
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